Mercer Law Review
Volume 46
Number 4 Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 3

7-1995

Antitrust
Michael Eric Ross

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Recommended Citation
Ross, Michael Eric (1995) "Antitrust," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 46 : No. 4 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol46/iss4/3

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Antitrust

by Michael Eric Ross*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh Circuit handed down only two antitrust decisions in
1994.1 Both affirmed judgments for defendants under the "state action"
doctrine.2
II. SURVEY
Private conduct is protected from antitrust liability by the state action
doctrine if (i) undertaken "pursuant to a 'clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy' to replace competition with
regulation' and (ii) "actively supervised" by the state.4 On the other
hand, municipalities and other local governmental entities have to
satisfy only
the first prong of this test to qualify for state action
5
immunity.
Anticompetitive behavior may be fully in line with a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy" even if not expressly

*. Partner in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Florida
(A.B., 1971); Harvard University (J.D., 1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia. The opinions
expressed in this Article are the personal views of the author.
1. See FTC v. Hospital Bd. of Directors, 38 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1994); Municipal
Utilities Bd. v. Alabama Power Co., 21 F.3d 384 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1096 (1995); see also Gas Pump, Inc. v. General Cinema Beverages of North
Florida, Inc., 12 F.3d 181 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (applying in part Georgia law)
(administratively dissolved corporation and its sole shareholder lack standing to bring
federal antitrust claim).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 3-49.
3. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569 (1984) (quoting Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54 (1982)).
4. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,410 (1978)).
5. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985).
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authorized by the state.' In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,7 the
Supreme Court held that it is enough if "[sluch conduct is a foreseeable
result" of a state regulatory scheme.'
By contrast, the "actively supervised" element of the state action
exemption is more demanding.' State officials must "have and exercise
power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and
disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy."1"
In Municipal Utilities Board v. Alabama Power Co., the Eleventh
Circuit considered for the second time whether the state action doctrine
shielded a public utility and twenty-two rural electric cooperatives in
Alabama from exposure under the Sherman Act 2 for allocating service
territories. The court of appeals previously held that "[tihe Alabama
Legislature has clearly articulated a policy to displace competition in the
retail electric market ... to prevent duplication of electric facilities" by
enacting two statutes that incorporated the challenged territorial
agreements."3 However, because these private agreements were not in
the record, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court
to determine whether the "actively supervised" part of the state action
test was met. 4
Although the agreements, standing alone, appeared to authorize the
parties to divide new customers without the Alabama Legislature's
approval,' the enabling legislation in issue expressly provided that "no
subsequent agreement shall be valid unless and until it has been
reviewed by the legislature."" The Eleventh Circuit accepted the
district court's interpretation of this clause to mean that the Alabama
Legislature explicitly had to approve any customer allocations by
defendants even if, in the meantime, the affected customers might go

6. Id. at 41-42.
7.

471 U.S. 34 (1985).

8. Id. at 42. In Town of Hallie the Court concluded that Wisconsin statutes
authorizing municipalities to construct and operate sewage systems and to refuse to service
unincorporated areas immunized the City of Eau Claire from antitrust liability for refusing
to supply sewage treatment services to land owners in surrounding towns unless they voted
to have their property annexed and to use the City's sewage collection and transportation
services. See id. at 43.
9. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992).
10. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988).
11. 21 F.3d 384 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1096 (1995).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 111 1991).
13. Municipal Util. Bd. v. Alabama Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493, 1502 (11th Cir. 1991).
See generally Mullis, Antitrust, 43 MERCER L. REV. 999, 1018-20 (1992).
14. 934 F.2d at 1504-05.
15. 21 F.3d at 386.
16. Id. at 387 (quoting ALA. CODE § 37-14-36 (Michie 1992)).
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without electricity.17 The court of appeals refused to second-guess the
wisdom of this legislative decision i" or to look into whether it reflected
the independent judgment of the Alabama Legislature."
The state action doctrine also proved to be dispositive in FTC v.
Hospital Board of Directors.' Again, it was found to be available to
defendants.
The FTC brought suit under Section 7 of the Clayton Act21 to prevent
the Hospital Board of Directors of Lee County, Florida (the "Board"),
d/b/a Lee Memorial Hospital ("Lee Memorial"), from acquiring Cape
Coral Hospital ("Cape Coral"), a private, non-profit hospital.' According to the Commission, this transaction would be anticompetitive by
reducing the number of general hospitals in Lee County from four to
three and increasing Lee Memorial's market share from forty-nine
percent to sixty-seven percent. 23
The district court dismissed the case on summary judgment under the
state action doctrine without any assessment of the actual competitive
impact of the acquisition.' The Eleventh Circuit upheld this ruling. 5
The Board is a non-profit public body created in 1963 by special act of
the Florida Legislature "to establish and to provide for the operation and
maintenance of a public hospital" in Lee County.2 By virtue of this
statute the Board acquired and expanded the hospital that later became
Lee Memorial, which at that time had one hundred percent of the
market.' The Board's enabling legislation was amended in 1987 to

17. Id.
18. Id.; accord, eg., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 574 (1994) (state does not have

to act "wisely' to be entitled to state action immunity); Fuchs v. Rural Elec. Convenience
Coop., 858 F.2d 1210, 1214 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989).
19. 21 F.3d at 387-88 n.4; accord,e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,
Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1991) (inappropriate under the state action doctrine to engage
in subjective analysis of the politics behind a city ordinance); Traweek v. City & County
of San Francisco, 920 F.2d 589, 592 (9th Cir. 1989).
20. 38 F.3d 1184 (l1th Cir. 1994).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. III 1991).
22. 38 F.3d at 1186.
23. Id. at 1186-87. Even without Cape Coral, Lee Memorial served 80%of Lee County's
Medicaid patients, 75% of its indigent patients, and 90% of the county's "penetrating
trauma" patients. Id. at 1186.
24. See FC v. Hospital Bd. of Directors, 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 70,593 (M.D. Fla.
1994). The Board alleged that consolidating Lee Memorial and Cape Coral would increase
operating efficiencies, reduce expenditures, alleviate Cape Coral's financial difficulties, and
enable the two hospitals to become an effective bidder for managed care contracts in Lee
County. 38 F.3d at 1186.
25. The acquisition was stayed pending appeal, which was expedited. 38 F.3d at 1187.
26. Id. at 1186 (quoting 1963 FLA. SPEC. LAws ch. 63-1552 § 1)).
27. Id.
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authorize it, among other things, to "establish and provide for the
operation and maintenance of additional hospitals" in Lee County and
to "control, any ... corporation ... or other organization, public or
private, which the... [Bhoard finds operates for the purposes consistent
with, and in furtherance of, the purposes and best interests of [Lee
Memorial] .......
It was uncontested that the Board is a political subdivision of the
State of Florida and hence did not have to satisfy the "actively supervised" condition of the state action doctrine. 2' Nor was there any
dispute that the Board was authorized to acquire Cape Coral.' The
only question on appeal, therefore, was whether this authorization
constituted a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" state
policy to displace competition with regulation under the "foreseeability"
standard of Hallie.2 1
The FTC maintained that a foreseeable anticompetitive effect "is one
that ordinarily occurs, routinely occurs, or is inherently likely to occur
as result of the empowering legislation." 2 As construed by the court
of appeals, the Commission was "attempting to impose a narrow
definition" of foreseeability that essentially turned it "into a test of
inevitability, falling just short of requiring the state to expressly indicate
its intention to displace competition." ' Not surprisingly, the Board
took a very different view. It contended that anticompetitive consequences are foreseeable for purposes of the state action doctrine if they
"can reasonably be anticipated to result from the powers granted by the
state."2
The Eleventh Circuit held that the Board had the better of this
argument. After carefully reviewing the Supreme Court's opinion in
Hallie and its own subsequent state action decisions, ' the court of
appeals "reject[ed] the suggestion that, in order to render anticompeti-

28. Id. (quoting 1963 FLA. SPEC. LAWS ch. 63-1552 § 1, as amended by ch. 87-438, § 1;
id. at § 23, as amended by ch. 87-438, § 7)).
29. Id. at 1188. See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
30. 38 F.3d at 1188.
31. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
32. 38 F.3d at 1188.
33. Id. at 1190.
34. Id. at 1188.
35. See id. at 1188-90 (discussing Askew v. DCH Regional Health Care Auth., 995 F.2d
1033 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 603 (1993); Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 980
F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1993); Central Florida Clinic for Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Citrus County
Hosp. Bd., 888 F.2d 1396 (11th Cir. 1989), affd without opinion, 738 F. Supp. 459 (M.D.
Fla.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); Commuter Trans. Sys. v. Hillsborough County
Aviation Auth., 801 F.2d 1286 (11th Cir. 1986)).
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tive conduct foreseeable, a state must enact either specific legislation
from which anticompetitive conduct must ordinarily or routinely occur
or specific legislation creating regulatory or monopolistic powers.""
Rather, while the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the requisite
foreseeability must be "more than merely 'plausible,'"3 7 it ruled that "a
foreseeable anticompetitive effect is one that can reasonably be
anticipated to result from the powers granted to a political subdivision
by the state.' 3
Nonetheless, the court of appeals was not willing to find this
foreseeability simply from the broad language of the 1963 and 1987
statutes that, respectively, created the Board and expanded its
powers.3 9 Instead, despite the admonition in Hallie against overly
intrusive investigations into legislative intent,' the Eleventh Circuit
felt compelled to delve into "the context in which the instant legislation
was enacted."41 As it explained: "[A] foreseeability analysis cannot be
done in isolation. 1b determine if specific anticompetitive consequences
were foreseeable, we must examine what the Legislature knew about the
market and the community at the time the legislation was enacted."42
The court of appeals thus pointed out that there was only one hospital
in Lee County in 1963 when the Board was created, and that the Board
used the powers given to it by the Florida Legislature to acquire this
hospital and thereby obtain a monopoly of acute-care hospital services
in Lee County for the past ten years.' Moreover, presumably with
knowledge of this development, in 1987 the Florida Legislature expressly
expanded the Board's existing implicit authority to acquire additional

36. Id. at 1191. The FTC contended that the Board could not take advantage of Hallie's
foreseeability test unless the state had granted it "either regulatory powers or the power
to be a monopoly public service." Id. at 1191 n.5. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
Commission was reading too much into Hallie by trying to restrict a state to "a binary
choice between using regulation or monopoly public service in order to render a political
subdivision's anticompetitive conduct foreseeable." Id. Nor was the court of appeals any
more receptive to the FTC's argument that anticompetitive behavior of a political
subdivision acting as a private party can never be foreseeable under Hallie. Id. (citing
McCallum v. City of Athens, 976 F.2d 649, 653 n.7 (11th Cir. 1992) (proprietary nature of
city's waterworks did not remove it from the state action exemption)).
37. Id. at 1191 n.6 (quoting FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1213 n.13
(11th Cir. 1991)).
38. Id. at 1191 (footnote omitted).
39. See supra text accompanying notes 26 and 28.
40. See 471 U.S. at 44 n.7.
41. 38 F.3d at 1191.
42. Id. at 1192.
43. Id.
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hospitals." The Eleventh Circuit inferred from this history that the
Florida Legislature "must have reasonably anticipated that further
acquisitions, resulting from the 1987 legislation, would increase the
Board's market share in an anticompetitive manner."'6
The court of appeals then reinforced its reading of legislative intent by
noting that in 1987 the Florida Legislature also passed a statute
requiring a certificate of need to construct new hospital facilities.' Lee
County at that time was at less than seventy-five percent of its licensed
acute-care inpatient beds and consequently had no need for additional
beds. 47 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "the acquisition
of one of the three competing hospitals in Lee County was a foreseeable
result of the Florida Legislature's granting the Board the authority to
add new facilities to its operation."" Indeed, to the court of appeals,
"[61learly, anticompetitive conduct was reasonably anticipated.' 9
III.

CONCLUSION

The antitrust workload of the Eleventh Circuit in 1994 matched its
lowest in at least the past twenty years with only two decisions.' Not
only did defendants prevail in both cases, but neither the private
plaintiffs in Municipal UtilitiesBoard nor the FTC in HospitalBoardof
Directors could even get to the merits of their antitrust claims because
of the state action doctrine. 1 Last year's antitrust docket in the
Eleventh Circuit was therefore almost a carbon copy of the 1992 term.62

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
50. See Ross, Antitrust, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1993).
51. However, the Commission was ultimately successful in blocking Lee Memorial's
acquisition of Cape Coral when Cape Coral found itself another buyer rather than litigate
all the way to the Supreme Court, which the FTC was prepared to do. See FTC: Watch No.
427, at 3 (Jan. 30, 1995).
52. See Ross, supra note 50, at 1055.

